The Legal Problems: An Introduction by Samuels, Alec
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 37 | Issue 2 Article 3
1971
The Legal Problems: An Introduction
Alec Samuels
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alec Samuels, The Legal Problems: An Introduction, 37 J. Air L. & Com. 163 (1971)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol37/iss2/3
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION
ALEC SAMUELS*
Perhaps the most vexing feature of aircraft hijacking is the paucity of
unanimity among the affected nations in finding pragmatic methods for
its control. The various international conferences have been designed
principally to relieve political unrest, the most common element in pre-
venting a cure, but the doctor has caught the disease and the number of
hijackings continues to rise. In this article Mr. Samuels introduces the
problem by outlining the basic principles and propositions that must
either be utilized or overcome for any cooperative effort to be successful.
T HE EVIL of aerial hijacking needs little emphasis; it has a universal
effect; international communications are disrupted and endangered,
and human rights and lives are threatened. Hijacking is also more likely
to involve unpredictable factors such as political motives or an unbal-
anced mind than other types of crime, thus making national or inter-
national control of the offense extremely difficult, if not impossible
More germane to the discussions in this symposium, however, are the
narrower political and legal problems presented by hijacking-which are
considerable-and call for international cooperation in order to achieve
the proper solutions. These problems involve jurisdiction, prosecution,
punishment, extradition and related issues. This paper will be confined
to observations involving these problems and is intended to provide only
an overview for purposes of introduction to the more detailed analyses
appearing elsewhere.
*Barrister, Reader in Law in the University of Southhampton.
'For example, on a Chicago-New York flight in June, 1971, Mr. Gregory White of
Illinois allegedly hijacked the plane, assaulted the stewardess and killed a passenger who
apparently was trying to come to her aid. The Times (London), June 14, 1971, at 5,
col. 8. Another example is an attempted hijacking of a Colombian aircraft in March
1969, resulting in a gun-battle between the alleged hijacker and local police at a re-
fueling stop and causing the death -of both the hijacker and a flight engineer. Boston
Herald Traveler, March 12, 1969, at 1, col. 2. Other statistics are provided in the ap-
pendix to this symposium, infra at 229. See generally, Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its
Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1969). cf. Hearing on Aircraft Piracy Before
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 91-33, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as Aircraft Piracy].
2 See Evans, supra note 1, at 710. The political vis h vis personal motives involved
in hijacking are more fully developed by Professor Evans infra at 171-81..
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1. Piracy
The question whether aircraft hijacking constitutes "piracy" is the
subject of avid controversy.' "Piracy," by customary rule of international
law, is a universal crime, jus gentium, which implies robbery and pillage
at sea and requires attack on a ship from another ship;' and the better
view is that "hijacking" is not "piracy."' The Geneva Convention of
1958' is the source of some of the difficulty, as it includes the word "air-
craft" in the definition of piracy." Although the Convention arguably
applies to attacks from within an aircraft, the provisions plainly were
not directed to hijacking. Furthermore, many hijacking incidents have
been politically motivated,8 and customary international law requires
that piracy must be for private ends.' Thus, aircraft hijacking does not
parallel the developed international law regarding piracy at sea, and the
proper manner of defining the contemporary crime is the creation of a
new, unnamed "offense," accomplished in the 1970 Hague Convention."
2. Prevention
The means for deterring the hijacking threat is a combination of
psychological, sociological, and technological devises, designed prin-
'Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902 (i), 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i) (1970),
amending 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i) (1964) with Wurfel, Aircraft Piracy-Crime or Fun?,
10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 820, 840 (1969).
4 A "pirate" is an outlaw, hostis humani generis, and loses both the protection of his
home state and his national character. He is subject to summary justice anywhere, by
any state, as an enemy of that state. All states tacitly consent to suppress piracy by any
means possible. 2 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 681 (1941); cf. United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1817).
5Shubber, Is Hijacking of Aircraft Piracy in International Law?, 43 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 193 (1968-69); cf. Johnson, Arthur, & Barham, Hijacking: Why Governments
must Act, 74 AERONAUTICAL J. 143 (1970).
1 Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1962] 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, Art. 15-17.
'Article 15 (1)(a) defines piracy as:
[A]ny illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, com-
mitted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, against another ship or air-
craft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.
For a criticism of the applicability of this treaty to contemporary aircraft hijacking,
see Wurfel, supra note 3.
'See e.g., DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN POLICY BRIEFS, Vol. 18, No. 14 (Dec. 30, 1968).
'HACKWORTH, supra note 4, at 681.
1°Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for
signature December 16, 1970, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8920, art. I [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion]. See generally White, The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, 6 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 38 (April-June 1971); Evans, supra
note 1, at 703-10.
For purposes of defining the legal status of aircraft hijacking, it should be noted that
article 11 of the Tokyo Convention provides for the restitution of an aircraft to its
commander and resumption of the flight, but it is not designed to deal with hijacking
nor does it provide for arrest and punishment of the alleged offender. See Convention
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, opened for sig-
nature Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 6768, art. 11. See generally
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cipally for determining the persons who demonstrate a higher statistical
probability for committing the offense than the general population.1
These devises include careful checking of passenger lists, the magneto-
meter to detect weapons," armed guards, armed flight crews, depressuri-
zation, non-access to the flight deck, dogs, and even a concealed trap-
door on the threshold of the crew door over which the hijacker might
be maneuvered." The use of these measures has limitations, however. As
a practical matter, there is no guarantee that any one device will be
effective-the potential hijacker may appear to be respectable and have
his documents in order; the magnetometer often detects inoffensive
items, causing embarrassment and delay to the passengers; most pilots
dislike the idea of being armed; depressurization is potentially dangerous
and affects all passengers on board the aircraft; inaccessibility to the
flight deck does not protect the stewardess who can be made a hostage;
dogs usually are easily dealt with by the professional criminal; and the
trap-door accidentally may open at the wrong time and for the wrong
person. On the other hand, even if the procedures instituted to detect
hijackers are functionally workable, they nevertheless become unaccept-
able when abused. Excessive or unnecessary force may not be used, even
against the hijacker, in a civilized society; nor can summary justice be
tolerated. Moreover, the criminal law of any state only prosecutes illegal
acts. States cannot, consistent with fundamental notions of justice, con-
demn persons merely because they represent potential danger. Neverthe-
less, security consciousness does have a part to play and has contributed
to the failure of a number of attempted hijackings.' So long as states are
Samuels, Crimes Committed on Board Aircraft: Tokyo Convention Act 1967, 42 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 271 (1967); Lester, Crimes on Aircraft, 117 NEw L.J. 497 (1967).
" Cf. Comment, Aircraft Hijacking: Criminal and Civil Aspects, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
72 (1969).
11 Basically, the magnetometer depends upon magnetic field detectors which are dis-
torted when they pass through metal thus creating a signal that can be amplified and
calibrated to detect magnetic disturbances. See Marshall, An Analytic Model for the
Fluxgate Magnetometer, 3 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MAGNETICS 1 (1967). Cf. Toothman,
Legal Problems of Skyjacking, [1969] ABA SECT. INS. N. & C.L. 251, 257. The mag-
netometer, as well as several other devises used in an "anti-hijacking system" employed
at John F. Kennedy Airport, was recently held constitutional by a New York federal
district court in United States v. Lopez, 11 Av. CAs. 5 18,141 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1971).
"See Evans, supra note 1, at 704.
'ASee, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1968, at 1 col. 4. See also Aircraft Piracy,
supra note 1, at 6. In the United States some passengers have sought to establish a
cause of action in negligence against the airline for not taking the proper precautions
necessary to prevent hijacking. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1969, at 62, col. 6. The Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970) imposes the duty on
every air carrier to provide safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities in con-
nection with interstate and overseas air transportation. Domestically, civil suits seeking
damages are usually based on negligence for breach of the duty of the highest degree of
care to the passenger. See, e.g., Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir.
1959). With respect to international flights, recovery is sought based on the Warsaw
Convention which provides for absolute liability. Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention),
1971]
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willing to put themselves in a position to ensure the prevention of abuse
should it arise, the substantial interest in preserving the safety of air
travel by preventing hijacking by utilizing protective devises clearly out-
weighs any potential misuse of the techniques."
3. The Municipal Offense
Because of its novelty, hijacking per se is not a municipal offense in
many states; accordingly, the offender must be tried in these jurisdictions
for a collateral offense, such as assault, intimidation, kidnapping and
theft, or not at all."0 In the United States, for example, until a series of
hijackings caused Congress to amend the Federal Aviation Act in 1961,"
prosecution was maintained primarily for transporting stolen property
in interstate commerce,'" kidnapping,1" or obstructing commerce by
threats or violence."0 The effect is significant in that, despite various bases
of jurisdiction recognized in international law," it is entirely possible that
no state would be able under municipal law to assert jurisdiction over
the offense. If, for example, it is unknown over which state a hijacking
occurred, or if the offense took place over the high seas, the municipal
laws of any particular country would not provide a basis for jurisdiction.
The crime could well go unpunished.2
Article 1 of the 1970 Hague Convention now provides a useful defi-
nition which, hopefully, will be universally adopted into the municipal
laws. A hijacker is any person who "(a) unlawfully, by force or threat
thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control
of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act or (b) is an accom-
plice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act."'"
Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (concluded at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 12,
1929). To date, there are no reported decisions applying either theory to a situation
involving hijacking.
1" Article 6 of the 1970 Hague Convention, supra note 10, provides for arrest, pre-
liminary investigation, and the right of the arrested person to communicate with a
representative of his own state.
10 For an extended discussion and examples of the problems raised, see Mendelsohn,
In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo Convention,
53 VA. L. REV. 509 (1967).
1749 U.S.C. § 1472(i)(1) (1970), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1964) (orig-
inally enacted as Act of Aug. 23, 1958, Ch. 9 § 902, 72 Stat. 784).
1" 18 U.S.C. S 2312 (1970).
1" 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1966); see United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964).
0 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970); see United States v. Bearden, 304 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1962), vacated on other grounds, 372 U.S. 252 (1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964).
21 For a detailed analysis of the historical development and applicability of the
various theories in an aviation context, see Fentson & DeSaussure, Conflict in the Com-
petence and Jurisdiction of Courts of Different States To Deal With Crimes Committed
on Board Aircraft and the Persons Involved Therein, 1 McGILL L.J. 66 (1952).
2"See Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 513.
s Convention, art. 1.
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The offense appears to be committed regardless of motive. To be hi-
jacked, however, the aircraft must be "in flight."" An aircraft is "in
flight" so long as its external doors are closed." The Convention does
not apply to domestic flights, because no international element is in-
volved; nor does it apply to military, customs or police aircraft."
4. Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional problems have been difficult. The hijacking often takes
place outside the jurisdiction of the receiving state, although in most,
if not all, of the cases presumably it could be argued that the offense is
of a "continuing nature."'" In international law, jurisdiction may be as-
sumed by a state on a number of different bases: the territorial principle,
the nationality of the alleged offender, the nationality of the victim, the
effectiveness principle, the landing principle and others. 8 The 1970 Con-
vention requires the parties to assume jurisdiction when (a) the offense
is committed on board an aircraft registered in that state; (b) the air-
craft on which the offense is committed lands in its territory with the
alleged offender still on board; and (c) the offense is committed on
board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal
place of business or his permanent residence in that state." An oppor-
tunity for conflicting jurisdiction is clearly present, although in practice
primary jurisdiction will be exercised by the state of landing in the first
instance under the principle of the presence of the offender. Mere pres-
ence of the alleged offender is also sufficient to establish jurisdiction in
addition to any existing criminal jurisdiction" where, for example, na-
tionality is retained for serious offenses committed anywhere."
5. The Duty to Prosecute
Hijacking is a serious offense; it follows that states should be com-
pelled to prosecute the alleged offender. This proposition was urged by
the United States and the Soviet Union "' at the conference at The Hague,
but it was not adopted because a number of states such as the United
Kingdom grant discretion to prosecuting authorities, who may act inde-
24Id.
1" Id. art. 3, par. 1.
11Id. par. 2, 3."
27 See, e.g., the Leila Khaled incident, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1970, at 14, col. 5,
where the British government, representing the receiving state, was faced with a situa-
tion in which the attempted hijacking took place in a foreign (Israeli) registered air-
craft over the high seas.
"8See Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 511-13; Fenston & DeSaussure, supra note 21.
29 Convention, art. 4, par. 1.
'Id. art. 4, par. 2.
"I Id. art. 4, par. 3.
8 PROTOCOL SUBMITTED TO SUBCOMM. ON UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT OF THE
LEGAL COMM. OF ICAO, LCISC.SA. WD. 7 (Jan. 31, 1969).
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pendently of the executive. Therefore, article 7 of the Convention re-
quires submission to competent authorities "for the purpose of prose-
cution," which appears to mean for the purpose of considering whether
to bring a prosecution rather than establishing compulsory prosecution.
The Convention also requires that the decision whether to prosecute
shall be made in the same manner as in the case of an ordinary offense
of a serious nature." This is a practical and just requirement. Lack of
evidence or humanitarian reasons are examples rendering prosecution
either difficult, impracticable, or undesirable.
6. Penalties
Consistency in punishment is notoriously difficult to reach, and the
1970 Convention is content with requiring "severe penalties." 4 Thus,
whatever the mitigating factors may be, hijacking at least is to be treated
as a serious offense. Many countries reject the concept of a minimum
sentence as being too inflexible. Moreover, it would be as difficult to set
a suitable maximum sentence since this may well cause the death of an
innocent person.' However, even if the hijacker is genuinely seeking
political asylum, he should attempt to find other means of escape before
any question of political asylum is considered, and he should suffer a
severe punishment for a hijacking.
7. Extradition
Extraditing the hijacker frequently has not been possible because no
extradition treaty exists between the requesting and the requested state,
or, if one exists, it does not cover hijacking." This problem is solved by
the Convention by the provision that the offense shall be deemed to be
included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty existing
between the contracting parties." In the absence of a treaty, the Conven-
tion itself is to be the legal basis for extradition,8 thus making extradition
possible between all ratifying states.
Is there a duty to extradite? Some states, notably the United States
and the Soviet Union, took the view at the Conference that a hijacker is
a universal enemy of mankind and therefore should, in all cases, be extra-
dited to the requesting state.39 But the Western European states, ad-
' Id. These articles are more fully discussed elsewhere in this symposium. See
Mankiewicz infra at 195-210.
"
4Convention, art. 2.
'E.g., the United States, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (1970), and the Soviet Union both pro-
vide for the death penalty. The effectiveness of the penalty as a deterrent is questionable
in the case of most, if not all, of the offenders.
8 See infra at 166.
" Convention, art. 8.
38 Id.
'9 Protocol, supra note 32 (May 5, 1969).
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vancing a long tradition of refusal to extradite in political cases, declined
to agree to mandatory extradition. Accordingly, the Convention imposes
no duty to extradite, and the matter is left to the traditional discretion
of the states."0 Furthermore, even in the event that extradition is granted,
the requested state properly can impose conditions: for example, that
the person extradited shall not be tried for any offense other than that
stipulated by the requesting state.
The Convention does not specifically embody the principle of non bis
in idem, that a person should not be tried twice for the same offense;
presumably it applies, however, as a generally accepted principle of law
recognized by civilized nations.'
8. Sanctions
Attempts to eliminate hijacking have been frustrated by the attitude
of intransigent and irresponsible governments, unwilling to take effective
action against and even welcoming hijackers landing in their territory.'
However, steps can be taken to minimize the effectiveness of such states.
For example, an uncooperative state could be expelled from the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, as well as the International Air
Travel Association. In addition, states could refuse to fly to an offending
state; nationals of an offending state could be refused air travel facilities,
unless they previously consent to a thorough search. In this regard, the
air pilots' boycott of Algeria had some success in achieving the release of
a detained aircraft, crew, and passengers.' However, more extensive
boycotts of air pilots have been mooted.
Sanctions are, nevertheless, imperfect weapons. The danger of retali-
ation in an interdependent world is considerable. The dependence of
western countries on eastern countries for oil, for example, renders the
western countries quite vulnerable. Further, governments are sometimes
powerless to take action against hijackers."
Public opinion also may operate as a restraining influence; the com-
mutation of the death penalty to life imprisonment in the Soviet Jewish
hijacking instance probably was brought about by the strength of ad-
verse world opinion.'
10. An International Tribunal
The hijacker, like the pirate, is peculiarly suitable as a subject for an
40 Convention, art. 8.
41 See H. JACOBINI, INT'L LAW: A TEXT (Rev. ed. 1968).
'A frequently cited example is Cuba. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 25, 1961, at 1,
col. 7 (late city ed.); 45 DEP'T STATE BULLETIN 334, 407 (1961).
41 See Evans, supra note 1, at 705.
" E.g., the Palestine guerrillas operated from Jordan, but were beyond the control
of the Jordan government.
I N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.).
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international criminal tribunal; he commits an offense that potentially
has universal impact. The need for the establishment of such a tribunal
was demonstrated by the Ndirnberg trials and the Eichmann case and
has been urged by the Secretary-General of the United Nations." But the
difficulties of such a project are immense-a truly international site must
be found; independent judges must be appointed; a suitable charter must
be drafted. Notwithstanding the danger of delay, the time is simply not
yet ripe. The 1970 Convention, based on the principle of mutual co-
operation, seems, for the moment at least, more realistic and more likely
to produce results.
CONCLUSION
Prospects for the future do not appear bright. Unfortunately, the
political unrest and division prompting acts of hijacking equally inhibit
a universal solution. As long as some intransigent governments continue
directly or indirectly to support acts of violence and terrorism against
civil aviation, refuse to punish offenders effectively, and refuse to co-
operate in international conventions the problem will remain. Hijacking
shows no signs of abating. The offense has come to involve not only the
diversion of a flight to Cuba to accommodate the dissatisfied left-winger,
but also the much more serious seizure of hundreds of innocent people
as political hostages. Nevertheless, the 1970 Convention represents the
best hope of successful international action. All responsible govern-
ments should consider it a matter of imperative and urgent duty to ratify
and implement the Convention as soon as possible.
"See, e.g., Address by Secretary-General U Thant, United Nations 25th Anniver-
sary Program New York City, Sept. 14, 1970, Press Release SG/SM/1333, ANV/87.
The necessity of an international court is the subject of a paper by Professor R. H.
Mankiewicz infra at 195-210.
